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Abstract

The need to verify correct circuit operation has grown in recent years due to
adversaries ability to compromise DoD systems. The DARPA program addressed this issue
and implemented the DARPA TRUST program to verify untrusted circuits using software.
The DARPA TRUST program was initiated in 2006 and due to this the limitations and
potential errors in the program have not yet been fully explored.
This research identifies the potential errors in the program by conducting transistorlevel testing on circuits. The DARPA TRUST program currently operates at the gatelevel and conducting various experiments at the transistor-level brought to light potential
problems with current DARPA TRUST testing. The way that transistor-level verification
is conducted is through netlist matching. A schematic of a circuit is created and the
netlist is extracted, after that a metal layout of a circuit is created and the netlist is
extracted. Once the two netlists are extracted, a matching program is used and the result
determines if the verification process is successful. Parasitic capacitance was extracted in
the metal layout version of a circuit and netlists were compared with the schematic version.
Results show that parasitic capacitance is overlooked in the DARPA TRUST program even
though this could potentially cause a fabricated device to fail. Transmission lines were
simulated by creating metal wiring between two inverters. These metal lines mimic the
operation of a transmission line. These transmission lines were experimented on and it
was determined that the DARPA TRUST program does not effectively check for potential
errors in transmission line fabrication. The results of this research brought to light the
vulnerabilities in the DARPA TRUST program and addressed the need for the program to
conduct transistor-level testing.
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EXPLORATION OF DIGITAL CIRCUITS AND TRANSISTOR-LEVEL TESTING IN
THE DARPA TRUST PROGRAM

I.

Introduction

In 2006, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) established the
Trusted for Integrated Circuits (TRUST) program to verify circuit operation manufactured
from untrusted sources due to the Department of Defense (DoD) need for trustworthy
hardware [6]. In recent years, the necessity to provide accurate testing on integrated circuits
has increased. In 2008 Business Week published an article bringing to light threats on
integrated circuits due to companies outsourcing their products [9]. This article discussed
the potential for compromised designs due to companies outsourcing the fabrication of
their circuits. In particular, four counterfeit Xicor chips were discovered in the flight
computer of an F-15 fighter jet at Warner Robins Air Force Base [9]. Another example
of circuit tampering happened in 2007 in the Syrian military. A Syrian radar failed to warn
of an incoming air strike and a backdoor built into the system’s chips were rumored to
be responsible [29]. Due to the necessity of verifying correct circuit operation, the DoD
wants to establish a reliable supply of custom hardware [23]. Very-large-scale integration
(VLSI) circuits designed for the DoD are typically low-volume products that are not highly
profitable for commercial manufacturers [7]. However, the Department of Defense also
relies on commercial built hardware in their systems that are mass produced and the need
to verify the correct operations of these circuits is a necessity [28]. Additionally, custom
hardware in DoD systems have a strict set of specifications that extend beyond commercial
chip requirements for environmental factors, reliability, and useful life [26]. The supply
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chain for these custom DoD hardware systems must provide functional, trusted hardware
as well as being competitive with available commercial technologies [20].
1.1

DARPA TRUST
The United States does not have a comprehensive program to certify that integrated

circuits (IC) going into U.S. weapon systems do not contain malicious circuits [14]. Due
to these concerns, DARPA initiated the TRUST program to develop a system to ensure
the trust of ICs used in military infrastructure, but designed and fabricated under untrusted
conditions. Untrusted conditions means any point in the process of circuit inception to
fabrication that has the potential to produce a bad or tampered integrated circuit [25].
Differing from other approaches to verifying circuit operation, the DARPA TRUST
program assigns measurable metrics to determine correct circuit operation [14]. These
two metrics are PD and PFA which corresponds to the probability of detecting a malicious
transistor and the probability of falsely identifying an operational transistor as malicious.
The measurable metrics and testing method used by the DARPA TRUST program have
never been used in circuit verification before, which makes this program a unique view on
trusting circuits. These two metrics are; the probability of detecting a malicious insertion
and the probability of false alarms. A more traditional approach to the identification of
a circuit that was maliciously attacked is to have the Trojan Horse being the signal. The
term Trojan Horse was originally invented when the Greek soldiers tried to invade Troy but
were unsuccessful. They ultimately left but provided a wooden horse as a gift at the gate
of Troy. This horse was taken into the city and during the night Greek soldiers came out
of the horse and destroyed the city. Nowadays, a Trojan Horse is a seemingly innocuous
piece of hardware or software that actually is malicious to the design [29]. However, the
TRUST program uses a more basic measurement where any change in the IC is considered
to be a malicious attack. The first DARPA TRUST experiment was testing and verifying a
64-bit adder that had two malicious transistors added to the design [8].
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1.2

Research Problem
This research focuses on the use of digital circuits in integrated circuit verification.

Since the DARPA TRUST program is fairly new, the research limitations of the program
has not been fully explored. This research will further explore the limitations to see if real
world digital circuits can be verified with the DARPA TRUST tools as well as possible
problems with the current DARPA TRUST program. In recent years, there has been a
movement from analog circuits to digital circuits in everyday use, and therefore the need
to verify these digital circuits is substantial. One of the reasons for this is that computers
are mostly digital because they run on a clock. Also, digital circuits enables smaller size,
lower power, and lower parts counts [27].
Digital circuits are made up of combinatorial logic gates connected to a clock
to synchronize events between these gates. The number of logic gates between each
digital circuit provide a range based on technology and to this date there has not been
a characteristic study on the amount of logic gates versus the TRUST program output.
For example, a basic XOR2 gate is comprised of 5 NAND2 gates, and a 1-bit full adder
has 13 NAND2 gates. Usually adders are not one bit and for a simple 16-bit adder the
number of NAND2 gates is 208 NAND2 gates. As one can see, the number of gates scales
between just these two simple circuits. In this research, digital circuits will be pulled
from a third party source (opencores.org), and run through the DARPA TRUST suite to
determine each circuit’s metrics. Each digital circuit will be optimized under different
parameters (power, speed, area, etc.) to see if there is any difference in the output of the
DARPA TRUST program. Once these results have been achieved, a better understanding
on the correlation between the number of logic gates and the DARPA TRUST output will
be achieved. Also, the results could potentially show which digital structures are more
vulnerable to tampering. For example, an AND gate might be more likely to be tampered
with than an inverter gate.

3

Various circuit changes will be implemented to see if the DARPA TRUST program
can handle these changes. These circuit changes will include custom vs. built-in circuits
taken from a library, the effect of parasitic capacitance on circuits, and if transmission lines
affects circuit operation. As of right now, the DARPA TRUST program only operates at the
gate-level. Making these small changes in circuits will affect the transistor-level of circuits.
Hopefully this research can try to exploit possible vulnerabilities and could prove that the
TRUST program should also look at doing transistor level testing of circuits.
1.3

Justification
As stated in the article presented by [9], the DoD has a need to verify circuits fabricated

from untrusted sources. The potential for our adversaries to compromise our hardware
components for espionage is far too great for the DoD to idly stand by. This is why the
DARPA TRUST program was initiated and continues to be a vital component in the war
fighting effort of the DoD. One reason that the DARPA TRUST program exists is that
fabrication centers are very expensive to build in today’s economy. Even though the US
has microelectronic fabrication centers, a lot of the time the DoD outsources the majority
of the fabrication process to outside centers since it is cheaper [17]. Since the DoD does
not have it’s own fabrication center, it is even more paramount that digital circuits need to
be verified since it’s source could potentially be corrupted.
Not all malicious attacks occur at the beginning of circuit operation. Sometimes these
attacks occur slowly over time like a ticking time bomb that is just waiting for the right
time to go off. These tampered with parts can be disguised as military grade electronics
that are just waiting for the opportune time to cause havoc on DoD systems. These parts
may not fail until subjected to environmental stresses outside the normal, commercial
specification [17]. Therefore, it is a necessity that the DARPA TRUST program exists
to counteract these potential security threats dealing with integrated circuits.
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1.4

Proposed Methodology
This research builds upon previous algorithms implemented in software by contractors

in pursuit of the DARPA TRUST program. In particular, the research follows on with
research conducted by 2Lt Michael Seery [28]. This research will build on the existing
DARPA TRUST output toolset by investigating success and failure cases of digital circuits,
differing in logic gate complexity, and attempting to push the DARPA TRUST program to
its limit at the transistor-level.
One of the first steps in this research is to identify which intellectual property (IP)
cores to test with the DARPA TRUST program. First, a baseline experiment will be
conducted to provide basic outputs and then different IP cores will be selected based
on the number of logic gates to increase the complexity of the circuit. These cores
will be synthesized in software under different constraints (speed, power, area, current
levels, bias conditions, etc.), to enable the utilization of various and wider logic gates.
The synthesis of these cores will be performed in Cadence Encounter software, and the
verification will be performed in Cadence Conformal. The verification process deals with
the mapping of netlist created both in the forward and reverse direction of the digital circuit
creation process. This process will help identify how the different constraints affect the
DARPA TRUST tools throughput given various synthesized known circuit cores. The
same circuit that is optimized for speed might have a different output from the DARPA
TRUST tools than that same circuit optimized for area. The goal is to identify how
the different constraints affect the performance of the DARPA TRUST tool in detecting
malicious contents.
Another area that this research will focus on is varying circuit inception to see if
there are any problems in the DARPA TRUST program. For example, when fabricating a
circuit if built-in components are used, the custom component originally created might be
different than the built-in component. If this is the case, then the DARPA TRUST output
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might produce a bad result when in reality it is correct. Also, by extracting the parasitic
capacitance in the metal layout version of a digital component the DARPA TRUST output
could potentially be affected. The last circuit modification that will be investigated is the
use of transmission lines and if these lines will affect the DARPA TRUST output matching
process. Table 1.1 shows the output goals for this research.

Table 1.1: Output Goals for Research
Experiment

Software Used

Goals
Test/verify/characterize

Testing Digital IP Cores

Cadence Encounter/Conformal

output

of

TRUST

program
Determine if built-in cirCustom vs. Built-In circuits

Cadence Virtuoso

cuits affect TRUST program
Determine if parasitic

Extracting parasitic capacitance

Cadence Virtuoso

capacitance

affects

TRUST program
Determine if transmisImplementing transmission lines

Cadence Virtuoso

sion lines affect TRUST
program

1.5

Assumptions and Scope
A successful test for this experiment will yield a match between the input and output

product, (where the product in this case means the netlist). There are two outputs to the
DARPA TRUST program, PD and PFA , which refer to the probability of detection and the
probability of false alarm. For the DARPA TRUST program, the goal is to have PD as close
6

to 1 as possible and PFA to be as close to 0 as possible. When dealing with 3rd party IP
logic, it is assumed that the PD metric is not considered. This is because it is assumed that
malicious hardware has not been added to the actual logic code of the design. Therefore,
the goal of the experiment is to have the metric, PFA , be as close to 0 as possible. The
verification process uses the Cadence Conformal software and the nodes in the netlists are
compared. If all the nodes in the forward and reverse direction are mapped together than
the circuit was not tampered with. However, if there is a difference between the two netlists
than the DARPA TRUST program outputs the two metrics, PD and PFA , and gives the
corresponding value to each metric.
A successful test for the circuit manipulation experiment will be analyzing the
transistor-level netlist matching process. It may be determined that the DARPA TRUST
program should start trusting circuits at a transistor level as well as a gate-level.
1.6

Materials and Equipment
This research will be conducted in the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) Mixed

Signals Design Center (MSDC) (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), OH) and at
AFIT in the VLSI lab. Most of this research will be conducted at Air Force Institute of
Technology (AFIT) in the VLSI lab using the Cadence software and the MSDC will be
used when the DARPA TRUST program is needed to verify the digital circuits. Testing for
this research will require the use of outside, 3rd party sources such as opencores.org for the
logic of digital designs. The main software design tool will be Cadence and this software
is available at the MSDC and the AFIT VLSI lab.
The equipment needed for this research is already provided at AFRL’s MSDC and the
AFIT VLSI lab. This includes all lab stations that are able to run both Linux and Windows
machines, as well as sufficient hardware and software packages needed to complete this
test. Since the Cadence design tools are the most important toolset for this experiment,
the MSDC and the VLSI lab has ample software capabilities for the research be completed
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over there. The Cadence Encounter software will help tackle the problem by synthesizing
digital circuits and breaking them down to their netlists. Once the circuit and netlists have
been created, the Cadence Conformal software will attempt to map the forward and reverse
direction netlists to help verify circuit operation.
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II.

Background

As described in Chapter 1, there are unique challenges in verifying correct circuit
operation in VLSI circuits. It is not viable for the DoD to participate in in-house fabrication
since these manufacture centers are expensive and it is more viable to out-source this
process. Due to manufacturing costs, most of these fabrication centers are located overseas
where the profit margin is greater. This leads to a need to verify correct circuit operation
since the DoD could potentially fabricate circuits under untrusted conditions. The DARPA
TRUST program was initiated to combat this need.
2.1

DARPA TRUST
The DARPA Trusted for Integrated Circuits (TRUST) set forth to address the need to

combat an unknown, highly technologically advanced enemy, interested in destroying or
degrading military systems as well as collecting unauthorized intelligence by modifying
or creating hardware between design and delivery. With the premise that enemy agents
do exist in the world and would possess the motivation, opportunity, talent, manpower,
and time to conduct operations against a nation’s microelectronics resources: the threat
is considered credible by the Defense Technical Information Center [8]. The DARPA
TRUST program seeks to provide a quantifiable measurement that electronic components
must meet given the provided specifications. Also, these specifications do not differ in such
a way that would degrade the operation of the device, or provide unauthorized use. The
DARPA TRUST program focused on the application of the tools and methodologies on
custom designs in which the designer would have detailed knowledge in its construction.
However, in digital circuit designs there is a reliance on 3rd party IP that is provided via
the foundry, an IP vendor, or freely distributed on the Internet (i.e. opencores.org) which is
leveraged to create complex digital systems.
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2.1.1

Definitions.

In the case of this research, there will be three different definitions of “TRUST” that
will be applied. The first definition of “trust” when referring to electronic hardware comes
from the National Semiconductor Corporation. The National Semiconductor Corporation
defined “TRUST” as, “the ability of the Department of Defense to have confidence that a
system functions as intended and is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally
or unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the system at any time during its life
cycle.” [19]. The definition was originally intended to be applied to trusted software as
it was composed by the DoD for the Trusted Software Initiative. Since there is a strong
similarity between hardware and software trust problems, this definition of trust will be
applied to this research [11].
The second definition of trust was provided by the Defense Trusted Integration Circuit
Strategy (DTICS) memorandum, dated 10 October 2003, which led to the initiation of the
Trusted Foundry (TF) program [22]. The DTICS defined “TRUST” as, “trust” is the ability
to certify that designs sensitive to national security concerns are secure in the hands of a
commercial manufacturer [22]. The definition is useful when dealing with hardware that
is produced in high volume since commercial manufacturing is optimal but when dealing
with custom hardware, commercial manufacturing is not used.
One last definition of “trust” comes from former Acting Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Michael Wynne, who stated in 2004 that “trust”
is “the confidence in one’s ability to secure national security systems by assessing the
integrity of the people and processes used to design, generate, manufacture, and distribute
national security critical components.” [31].
2.1.2

Initial TRUST Program Case Study.

The challenge of verifying a digital circuit is immense. Just a few transistors in a field
of millions transistors may be to blame, and these transistors are identical to its neighbors.
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The interconnect and placement of hardware are imperative to locating malicious logic. The
DARPA Microsystems Technology Office (MTO) TRUST Project Presentation uses the
examples of a 64-bit adder containing two malicious insertions to identify the problem of
verifying digital circuits. This example illustrates the difficulty in identifying and verifying
digital circuits [8]. Figure 2.1 shows a layout of transistors identifying the malicious
alterations.

Figure 2.1: Metrics Challenge of 64-bit Adder [8]

The first transistor would cause an always-on state in an otherwise operational gate,
while the second alteration is an event triggered condition for a specific type of adder
input. The result of this experiment is an erroneous arithmetic output in the 61 st bit of
one possible adder output at the cost of only two circuit modifications at the transistor
level. The malicious insertion causes an erroneous output on the 61 st bit is because this
is where the malicious transistors were inserted. Again, identifying these two malicious
alterations provides a difficult problem. There are two quantifiable metrics that the DARPA
TRUST tools output. First, the probablity of detection (PD ) refers to the probability of
11

correctly identifying malicious transistors. Meaning that a PD value of 1 correctly identifies
all malicious transistors inserted while a value of 0 did not identify any of the malicious
alterations. Even malicious alterations to transistors can be operational, just not as they are
designed to behave. PD aims to identifying the number of incorrectly operating transistors
in a circuit. The probability for a false alarm in malicious transistor detecting is defined
as PFA . PFA refers to an operational transistor being identified as a malicious alteration by
the DARPA TRUST tools. A PFA value of 0 means that no operational transistors were
identified as malicious, while a PFA value close to 1 means many operational transistors
were identified as malicious alterations.
Functional testing on the 64-bit adder can verify that the adder does not produce the
correct output, but there is no way to locate the malicious insertion. This limitation is
demonstrated in Fig. 2.2. Functional testing on that adder has PD = 1, which is an excellent
output for identifying unusable chips since the initial DARPA TRUST experiment identified
that there are malicious transistors somewhere in the system. This PD value of one means
that all malicious transistors in the whole adder circuit were identified. However, PFA for
functional testing is unacceptably high. This means that the TF was unable to successfully
locate the malicious transistor in the field of 106 transistors. The PD and PFA metrics are
used to detect individual transistors and not used to detect inoperable devices (i.e. adders,
accumulators, decoders, etc.). It is also important to note that functional testing will not
necessarily identify all malicious logic in a circuit, if the insertion does not modify the
current output of the device. This means that if a Hardware Trojan is put in place to trigger
a bad output of a transistor based on lifetime, then the TF program will not initially identify
the circuit as being bad. Functional testing has the added benefit of, at the system level,
being a non-destructive, non-invasive test [18].
From an intelligence prospective, it is important to identify the physical location of the
malicious transistors. Knowing how a Hardware Trojan was implemented allows an analyst
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Figure 2.2: Functional test on example adder [8]

to predict future attack strategies as well as to identify the stage at which the trusted supply
chain may have been compromised. By this means a proactive strategy can be implemented
to combat hardware intrusions instead of merely waiting for an attack to occur. The DARPA
TRUST program uses guided metrics for PD , PFA , problem size, and solution runtime.
These results for the adder test are shown in table 2.1.

Table 2.1: DARPA TRUST Metric [8]
Metric

Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

PD

80.00%

90.00%

99.00%

PFA

1.00E-03

1.00E-04

1.00E-06

Problem Size (Transistor Count)

1.00E+05

1.00E+06

5.00E+07

Algorithm Runtime (Hrs)

480

240

120
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2.2

Factors Constraining DoD Demand of ICs
The DoD demand itself is very small in comparison to the private sector. For example,

there are only 187 F-22 Raptors operational as of today, each of them including a multitude
of custom components [13]. One hundred eighty seven is a small order size compared
to the production volume of most desktop microprocessors. However, the DoD has
sought to adhere to the DTICS memorandum definition of trust, which was originally
intended to “trust” a commercial manufacturer. The DoD stated that defense technologies
must improve at a similar rate to commercial devices, without regard for the decreased
production volume, in order for the strategy to be effective [24]. In other words, defense
technologies must be comparable in performance metrics to those devices used in the
commercial sector.
Volume of hardware is just one of the factors constraining the hardware manufacturing
of DoD based VLSI circuits. The Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) quantified
some of these factors, as shown in table 2.2, as a resource for the Professional Council of
Federal Scientists and Engineers.

Table 2.2: Defense vs. Commercial Requirements [5]
Commerical

Defense

System life span

less than 5 years

20 to 40 years

Quantities required

Very high volume (106 units)

Very low volume (102 to 103 units)

Fab production lifespan

2 years

Decades

Environmental

0 to 70 C

-55 to 125 C

Reliability/Quality

Lower, 10 years, non-hostile

High, hostile

Market share

greater than 90%

less than 0.1%
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As one can see from Fig. ??, the difference between commercial and defense systems
varies greatly. While the system lifespan for a commercial system is less than five years,
defense systems need to be operational for 20 to 40 years. For example, the Lockheed
C-130 Hercules has been in service since 1956 and this aircraft is still flown today [4].
Even though the technology used in 1956 is different than that from today, the aircraft has
a need to stay up to date with current technology and therefore custom hardware needs
to be integrated into the aircraft longer than that of typical commercial products. Due
to this fact, it is a greater importance for defense systems to be operating correctly and
not tampered with. DARPA TRUST was established to verify correct circuit operation
from untrusted sources and the C-130 is an aircraft where reliable circuits are a necessity.
Another difference between commercial and defense systems is the reliability and quality
of the systems. There is a critical need for defense systems to operate at a higher rate of
reliability than standard commercial systems due to the risk of injury and/or death. Again,
this means that verification of correct circuit operation is a necessity.
2.3

Quantifying Digital Diversity
This section outlines the need to quantify different digital components and process

them through the DARPA TRUST suite. There is a huge need to test and verify the
commercial IP cores that are available through open source. These cores are used by
many commercial manufactures since they are open source. One example of a website
online where these cores are available is through opensource.org. As of now, there has
not been significant testing and verification of these IP cores through the TRUST suite.
The purpose of this research is to perform a characteristic study of the different structures
of these cores. Some examples of cores that would be tested are: cryptography cores,
Fast-Fourier transform (FFT) cores, H.264 cores, etcetera.
The first step in the process is to identify which cores should be tested and why.
The obvious starting point for this step is to identify which cores are used most in the
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commercial manufacturing of circuits. For example, FFT cores are a key component in data
manipulation between the time domain and frequency domain. After identifying common
cores that are used in commercial manufacturing, the next step is to identify open cores
that are of an interest to the DoD. The purpose of DARPA TRUST is to verify circuits
used widely in the DoD. Once the cores have been identified the process becomes more
complicated. There needs to be some sort of test plan in place that identifies different areas
to stress with DARPA TRUST. These different areas can potentially include synthesizing
the circuits under different constraints like speed, area, etc. This process will help identify
how the different constraints affect how the DARPA TRUST suite verifies the circuit. The
same circuit that is optimized for speed might have a different output from the DARPA
TRUST suite than that same circuit optimized for area. The goal is to identify how the
different constraints affect the output.
Another area that can affect how the DARPA TRUST output will be generated is the
type of logic depth. The logical depth refers to the complexity of the logic in the system.
For example, an finite impulse response (FIR) filter is composed of adders, multipliers,
and registers. This type of logic is different from a cryptography core since the logic
is different. The goal of this process is to see if different logic affects the output of the
DARPA TRUST suite. The case might be that having a lot of multipliers in the design
affects the DARPA TRUST suite negatively compared to a sequence of registers. The
goal of this process is to identify if the different logic affects the verification process of
the TRUST suite. Table 2.3 shows the estimate for standard cell usage, by type, of an
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) core.
Sequential logic refers to the logic whose output depends not only on the present
value, but on the sequence of past events meaning this type of cell as some sort of memory.
Inverter cell usage strictly refers to the number of inverter gates in the AES core. Finally,
logic refers to all other logic in the AES core. This is comprised of combinational logic,
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Table 2.3: AES Core Compiler Estimates
Cell Usage

Instances

% of Instances

Area

% of Area

Sequential

12736

4.4946517

298165.862

14.1

Inverter

29395

10.3737661

110619.264

5.2

Logic

241228

85.1315822

1701046.368

80.6

Total

283359

100

2109831.494

100

which unlike sequential logic, has no memory and the output only depends on the current
value. As one can see from table 2.3, most of the area comes from the logic. One area of
interest that can be investigated is how the output would change from a core that has most
of the area coming from inverters compared with that from logic. Identifying this can help
with the DARPA TRUST program so that one can know which commercial cores can be
manufactured compared with those that should be manufactured from a trusted source.
2.3.1

Identification of IP Cores to Verify with DARPA TRUST.

One area of this research is to identify which cores to test with the DARPA TRUST
program. The IP cores that are going to be processed through the DARPA TRUST program
are open source, 3rd party IP cores taken from the OpenCores website. These open source
IP cores that are sometimes used in DoD systems. The DARPA TRUST program maintains
library locations for DoD-owned IP, to include classified components [12]. In 2008, an
estimated 9,356 counterfeit incidents were reported in the defense IC supply chain [10].
Figure 2.3 shows an outlook of counterfeiting incidents reported or suspected between
2005 and 2008. Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of these different types of counterfeit
incidents.
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Figure 2.3: Total reported or suspected hardware counterfeits, 2005-2008 [21]

As one can see from Fig. 2.4, the most common type of counterfeited circuits are
microprocessors. One hypothesis to explain this phenomenon is that microprocessors are
prone to timing violations. This hypothesis derived from the fact that microprocessors can
have multiple clocks running through them, and timing is a key role in the correct operation
of microprocessors. Timing constraints are one way in which a circuit can be tampered. If
a circuit fails to meet timing constraints, then the operation of the circuit will not behave
as predicted. Another hypothesis to explain this phenomenon is that microprocessors are
detected more often due to the relative high profit margin potential since microprocessors
are used every where in society.
2.3.1.1

Timing Violations.

Almost all of digital integrated circuits work on the principle of synchrony. To
summarize this statement, a common clock is used to synchronize all of its internal
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Figure 2.4: Companies reporting suspected or confirmed counterfeit microcircuits, by
type [21]

operations. Figure 2.5 shows a basic representation of the internal architecture of a digital
integrated circuit.

Figure 2.5: Internal architecture of digital ICs [32]

In order for timing constraints to be met, the clock period has to be longer in
time compared with the maximum data propagation through the logic to ensure correct
19

operation. Two timing constraints that must always be met are the setup and hold time.
Setup time is the amount of time data must be stabilized on the data line before the clock
changes. Hold time is the amount of time that data must be held on the data line after the
clock change. Figure 2.6 shows an outline of different timing constraints met and failed.

Figure 2.6: Timing constraint (a) fulfilled or violated: (b) setup violation, (c) early
latching. [32]

The goal of summarizing timing constraints is to pick IP cores from the opencores
website that are the most prone to failing timing violations. Running these circuits through
the DARPA TRUST Foundry will help identify which open IP cores do not meet timing
constraints and should be avoided.
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2.4

Exploration of TRUST Suite
Even though the DARPA TRUST program was initiated in 2006, there still needs

to be extensive research to discover the limitations and possible vulnerabilities of the
program. The DARPA TRUST program operates at the gate-level of verifying circuits and
the experiments conducted will be at the transistor-level. Bringing potential problems at
the transistor-level to light could potentially change the way the DARPA TRUST program
is conducted.
The DARPA TRUST tools are solving a very specific problem that is mapping
transistors in a flattened netlist to those represented in the register-transfer level (RTL)
reference. One area of exploration is how the parasitic capacitance in the metal layout
affects the output of the DARPA TRUST program. Parasitic capacitance is an unavoidable
capacitance that exists between the parts of a circuit due to the proximity to each other.
This parasitic capacitance can cause transistors and metal wiring to depart from “ideal”
conditions. In the case of this research, parasitic capacitance is introduced in the metal
layout of a circuit. There is always a non-zero capacitance between any two conductors
which can be significant at higher frequencies with closely space conductors, such as
wires [16].Therefore, there will be parasitic capacitance in the metal wiring of the layout
version of a circuit. For example, when a circuit designer creates a design, he or she
creates a schematic version of the circuit and submits it to the manufacturer to fabricate the
circuit. Most of the time, the circuit designer is not involved in this process, and therefore
the parasitic capacitance of the metal is not taken into consideration during design. At
this time, the DARPA TRUST program is not performing any experiments dealing with
parasitic capacitance so exploring how parasitic capacitance affects the DARPA TRUST
tools is a necessity.
The difference between the schematic version of an inverter and the metal layout of an
inverter is shown in Fig. 2.7 and Fig. 2.8.
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Figure 2.7: Schematic Inverter Design

As one can tell from Fig. 2.7 and Fig. 2.8, the difference between the layout and
schematic version of the circuit is immense. When creating the metal layout version
of a circuit, if the designer is not careful the parasitic capacitance can grow while the
circuit is still operational. Another test in the exploration of the limitations of the DARPA
TRUST program is the transmission lines between two digital devices. Figure 2.9 shows
a schematic representation of this where the red circles represent the transmission lines.
Transmission lines have the potential to cause errors in circuits if there is too much
capacitance on the transmission lines.
Other areas of exploration include purposefully added short circuits in the metal layout
to see how the DARPA TRUST program handles the flaw, increasing the power throughout
the circuit to affect the netlist to see how the DARPA TRUST output changes, and using
custom built circuits vs. built-in designs to see how the output changes.
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Figure 2.8: Metal Layout Inverter Design

Figure 2.9: Series Inverter

23

2.5

Conclusion
The need to verify and “trust” VLSI circuits is an important challenge that the DoD

faces. This research will provide more of an insight to the limitations of current programs
and will help the warfighter in current and future operations.
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III.

3.1

Methodology

Introduction
As described earlier, this research focuses the limitations and possible errors in

the DARPA TRUST program. Due to volume constraint problems, most of the digital
components used in DoD systems are fabricated overseas where the cost is more
economical. Potential threats associated with this phenomenon are what prompted the
creation of the DARPA TRUST program. This phenomenon brought the DARPA TRUST
program into implementation and is the reason why further research needs to be conducted
on this program.
The first step in this research is the creation of a basic digital circuit from inception
to fabrication and how the Cadence software tools will achieve this step. Digital circuit
cores will then be examined and analyzed with the Cadence RTL compiler and Cadence
Encounter tools. After that an equivalence check will be performed on the test circuits to
see if the expected output matches the actual output. Finally, basic digital circuits will be
manipulated to test the limitations and possible holes in the DARPA TRUST output.
3.2

Cadence Tools
The software used in this research is provided by Cadence. Cadence is an electronic

design automation (EDA) software company that produces software for designing
integrated circuits [15]. Cadence is used at a wide range of companies such as IBM and
organizations such as the DoD. There are three components of the Cadence software that
will be used in this research. The first product is Cadence Virtuoso. Cadence Virtuoso is a
tool used for designing custom integrated circuits. This is the platform where schematics,
custom layouts, extraction, and physical verification are performed. The second product is
Cadence Encounter. The Encounter platform is a tool for the creation of digital integrated
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circuits. This product is where floorplanning, synthesis, test, and place and route is
performed. The last product is the RTL compiler. This is the platform where VHDL models
are synthesized to be used for the Encounter program.
There are two libraries that will be used in this research. The most used library
is the North Carolina State University (NCSU) process design kit (PDK). The attached
technology to this library is 0.6 µm transistors. This transistor size is not up to date with
the current technology size but for this research this technology will suffice. The second
library used in this research is the University of Utah library. The attached technology for
this library is also 0.6 µm transistors. This library will be used in the built-in circuit stage
of this research.
There are different built-in functions in Cadence that will help achieve the end result
of this research. In the Cadence Virtuoso product, custom schematics and layouts are able
to be created. Once these are created Cadence has a layout vs. schematic (LVS) tool that
can compare the netlists of the schematic and layout view. This LVS tool will be one of the
main tools used in this research and will be discussed more later on in this paper.
3.3

Circuit Creation
3.3.1

Inception to Fabrication.

There is a specific flow of the TRUST tools that outlines the process from circuit
specifications to fabrication [30]. Figure 3.1 shows the TRUST tool forward and reverse
direction design flow.
This research will focus on Windows 1-3. Window 1 is where the 3rd party IP cores
will be implemented. These IP cores will be taken from the opencores.org website. VHDL
code from this website will be synthesized in the RTL compiler Cadence product. Window
2 is where the synthesis and test insertion will take place. Synthesis of the VHDL code
will be completed in the RTL compiler product. Test insertion is where a particular digital
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Figure 3.1: Forward and Reverse TRUST toolset design flow. [28]

component will be created. This will mostly be performed in the Cadence Virtuoso tool.
Window 3 is where Clock Tree, Insertion, and Place & Route will take place. This window
is accomplished in the Cadence Encounter software. Table 3.1 summarizes the correlation
between the TRUST tool, application, and window according to Fig. 3.1.

Table 3.1: Table describing window correlation to Cadence product
Tool

Application

Window

Internal Design

RTL Compiler

Window 1

3rd Party IP

RTL Compiler

Window 1

Synthesis

RTL Complier

Window 2

In-Place Optimization

RTL Compiler

Window 2

Test Insertion

Cadence Virtuoso

Window 2

Clock Tree Insertion

Cadence Encounter

Window 3

Place & Route

Cadence Encounter

Window 3
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3.3.2

How Cadence tools will achieve thesis completion.

This section will outline how the Cadence tools will achieve thesis completion. The
first step in circuit creation is to create a schematic based on certain specifications. These
specifications can include the type of digital component needed to complete the design,
the size of the transistors to be used in the component, and the pin names of the input and
output pins.
The second step in circuit creation is to create a metal layout design based on the
circuit schematic specification. NMOS and PMOS transistors are able to be inserted into
the metal layout design to create a layout of a circuit. The Cadence Virtuoso layout editor
is able to insert components needed for a metal layout design. These components include:
nTaps, pTaps, metal vias, and metal wires.
3.4

Digital Circuit Cores
The Cadence software has the ability to synthesize and test digital circuits. For this

research the digital circuit cores synthesized and tested will be 3rd party IP cores taken from
opencores.org.
3.4.1

RTL Complier.

The first step needed to synthesize and test digital circuit cores is to utilize the Cadence
RTL compiler tool. The Cadence RTL compiler has the ability to synthesize VHDL or
Verilog code to be used in the Cadence Encounter tool. The default language for the RTL
compiler is verilog, however for this research VHDL code will be utilized since that is the
preferred language of the author. Figure 3.2 shows a screenshot of VHDL code of a 4-bit
accumulator.
Using the code from Fig. 3.2, the code is synthesized in the RTL compiler to produce
a synthesized netlist to be used in the Cadence Encounter program. The synthesized netlist
produced by the RTL compiler is shown in Fig. 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: Example Accumulator VHDL Code [1]

The process outlined in this section was not produced by the author but was rather
introduced to show the methodology of the RTL compiler [3].
3.4.2

Cadence Encounter.

The Cadence Encounter program is used to develop complex digital circuits. The
first step in developing complex digital circuits is to import a synthesized netlist from the
RTL compiler. After that a library will be imported using the same technology as used in
the RTL compiler as well as timing definitions according to the user. The next step is to
develop the floorplan. This is where the global nets are connected and the power planning
is decided. After that the Place & Route is performed on the finished floorplan, and the
digital circuit is completed.
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Figure 3.3: Example Synthesized Accumulator Netlist [2]
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3.5

Matching Process
After the netlists are produced from each specific circuit the matching process will be

applied. The goal of the matching process is to compare two netlists to see if they match.
For this research, the netlist created from the schematic will be matched with the netlist
created from the metal layout. The design tool used will be the LVS tool. The LVS tool
imports netlists from both the schematic and metal layout of a circuit and then performs a
matching process on the netlists to determine if they match. A matching result means that
the two designs have the same internal architecture and therefore functionality.
Once the LVS tool is run the resulting output is an output log that describes the result
of the program. This output log lists all of the nets from both of the netlists and lists their
names. The output log says if the netlists match or do not match. If the netlists do not
match then the output log counts how many nets do not match and tries to rewire the nets
to produce a matching result. This is the end result of the research and determines if the
circuit was “trusted” correctly.
3.6

Manipulating TRUST output
The DARPA TRUST program is a fairly new program. Due to this, there can be

possible problems in the program that have not yet been explored. The first possible area
that has not yet been explored is how custom vs. built-in circuits affect the netlist matching
process. This will be accomplished by creating a custom schematic circuit and then perform
the matching process with a built-in layout design. The built-in circuits used in this research
will be taken from the University of Utah library. The circuits in this library range from
basic digital components such as inverters to more complex digital components such as
adders and multipliers. The custom schematic and layout circuits will be created using the
methodology outlined in this chapter and the netlists will be matched with the matching
process outlined in this chapter as well. This test will examine if different circuits with
the same functionality will result in a successful match in the netlists. Another possible
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area of unexplored territory is how parasitic capacitance affects the netlists and matching
process. The parasitic capacitance of the metal wiring can either be ignored or included in
the resulting netlist. This research will both extract and not extract parasitic capacitance
to see if the netlist has any change at all. The output log produced will be examined to
detect (if any) changes in the netlist. The last area of possible unexplored territory is how
transmission lines affect the netlist. Transmission lines will be simulated by placing long
metal wiring between two inverters. The metal wiring will be changed with each simulation
to detect (if any) changes in the netlist. First, normal metal wiring will be placed between
two inverters. After seeing the result of that simulation, a thick metal wiring will be placed
between two inverters to see the result. Finally, a long metal wiring line will be placed
between two spaced out inverters to detect changes.
3.7

Test Conditions
There will be five main tests that will be conducted in this research. These tests will be

conducted at the transistor-level and will shed light on potential problems with the DARPA
TRUST program only operating at the gate-level.
3.7.1

Initial Test.

The first test in this research will be called the “initial test.” This test will create
schematics and layouts for three different circuits: inverter, NAND2, and XOR2. The
schematic and layout for each circuit will be matched using the LVS tool described in this
chapter. The result of this initial test should produce a matching netlist result for all three
circuits.
3.7.2

Custom vs. Built-In Circuits.

The second test in this research will compare the same three custom circuits from the
initial test and compare them to built-in circuits derived from the University of Utah library.
Like the initial test, the netlists will be compared with the Cadence LVS tool. The result
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of this test will determine if the TRUST program is vulnerable to unmatched netlists when
custom circuits are needed.
3.7.3

Parasitic Capacitance.

The next test in this research will be examining the effect of parasitic capacitance
on the netlist of a circuit design. Parasitic capacitance can be extracted from the metal
layout step in the process. Once the parasitic capacitance has been extracted the Cadence
LVS tool will try and match the netlist with its resulting schematic. The result of this test
will determine if the TRUST program is vulnerable to unmatched netlists when parasitic
capacitance is extracted.
3.7.4

Transmission Lines.

The fourth test in this research will see if transmission lines has any affect on the
netlists. Transmission lines will be simulated by placing a metal wire between two inverters
of increasing size. The transmission line will be adjusted to differing lengths and widths
to see if the netlist changes. Also, inverter sizing will be changed to see if that affects the
netlist matching process. The result of this test will determine if the TRUST program is
vulnerable to unmatched netlists when transmission lines are involved.
3.7.5

IP Cores.

The last test in this research will test and synthesize IP cores to test the limitations
of the TRUST program. The IP cores will be synthesized in the Cadence RTL Compiler
and then the resulting synthesized netlist will be imported into Cadence Encounter. In
Encounter floorplanning, power distribution, and Place & Route will be conducted. Once
all this happens, the Cadence matching process will be applied to see if the TRUST program
is able to handle differing digital circuits. The result of this test will explore the limitations
of the TRUST program.
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IV.

Results

This chapter introduces the results of the experiments carried out as outlined in
Chapter 3. Each subsection of this chapter represents a different experiment that was
conducted and includes an analysis of ways the DARPA TRUST program was explored
and potentially areas where improvements can be made.
4.1

Initial Test
The initial test in this research was to perform a baseline experiment by creating a

schematic and layout design of basic circuits. These circuits included an inverter, a NAND2
gate, and an XOR2 gate. Once these circuits were created, they were matched with the
Cadence LVS tool.
4.1.1

Inverter.

The first test article was an inverter. Figure 4.1 shows the schematic version of an
inverter created in Cadence while Fig. 4.2 shows the metal layout version of the same
inverter. The width of the pMOS transistor was 6 µm, and the width of the nMOS transistor
was 3 µm. Once the two versions of the inverter was created the Cadence LVS tool was
run and created netlists for both versions as well as an output log showing the results.
Figure 4.3 shows the netlists for both versions and Figure 4.4 shows the output log of the
Cadence LVS tool. As expected, the netlists matched between the schematic and layout
versions of the inverter.
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Figure 4.1: Inverter Schematic

4.1.2

NAND2.

The second test article was a NAND2 gate. Figure 4.5 shows the schematic version
of a NAND2 gate created in Cadence while Fig. 4.6 shows the metal layout version of the
same NAND2 gate. Once the two versions of the NAND2 was created, the Cadence LVS
tool was run and created netlists for both versions as well as an output log showing the
results. Figure 4.7 shows the netlists for both versions, and Figure 4.8 shows the output
log of the Cadence LVS tool. As expected, the netlists matched between the schematic and
layout versions of the NAND2. While the difference between the inverter and the NAND2
does not seem like a lot, the complexity increases in the number of nets in the circuit.
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Figure 4.2: Inverter Metal Layout

Figure 4.3: Inverter netlists
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Figure 4.4: Inverter Matching Process Output Log
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Figure 4.5: NAND2 Schematic
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Figure 4.6: NAND2 Metal Layout
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Figure 4.7: NAND2 netlists

4.1.3

XOR2.

The next test article was a XOR2 gate. Figure 4.9 shows the schematic version of
a XOR2 gate created in Cadence, while Fig. 4.10 shows the metal layout version of the
same XOR2 gate. Once the two versions of the XOR2 were created the Cadence LVS tool
was run and created netlists for both versions as well as an output log showing the results.
Figure 4.11 shows the netlists for both versions, and Figure 4.12 shows the output log of
the Cadence LVS tool. As expected, the netlists matched between the schematic and layout
versions of the XOR2. As one can see, creating a metal layout design of a XOR gate has a
much higher complexity than the inverter gate. The netlists produced from the LVS tool is
much more complicated than the inverter, and the runtime increased dramatically between
the first and third experiment.
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Figure 4.8: NAND2 Matching Process Output Log

41

Figure 4.9: XOR2 Schematic

4.2

Custom vs. Built-In circuits
The next experiment conducted in this research was to compare custom designed

circuits to built-in circuits from Cadence to see if the matching process still worked. This
experiment would determine if a company could use their built-in circuit components in
a circuit without the integrity of the circuit becoming compromised. There were initial
problems that were run into due to the NCSU library used in this research. The pins were
not labeled in the NCSU, library and this caused the netlists to not match. This brought
up the issue of netlists matching because if the input, output, gnd, and vdd pins were not
correctly labeled then the netlists did not match correctly. This could cause issue to the
TRUST program because the verifier needs to make sure the pins are labeled correctly.
Another issue during this experiment is that the transistor level view of the NCSU library
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Figure 4.10: XOR2 Metal Layout

was not able to be examined, and therefore the netlist matching process was not able to
work. Figure 4.13 shows the XOR2 gate that was used in this experiment.
The results of trying to conduct this experiment are shown in Fig. 4.14. The error in
this experiment is that the schematic portion of the test was unable to flatten the netlist. The
schematic XOR2 gate was taken from the built-in NCSU library. After further examination
it was determined that a transistor level view of the XOR2 gate was not available and
therefore the netlist could not be flattened.
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Figure 4.11: XOR2 netlists
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Figure 4.12: XOR2 Matching Process Output Log
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Figure 4.13: NCSU Library XOR2 Gate

The solution to this problem was to use the University of Utah library, and once
this library was used the experiment was able to be conducted.

Another issue that

was discovered during this experiment is that even though two circuits have the same
functionality, the netlist matching process has the potential to produce a non matching
result. For example, there are many different ways to implement an XOR gate. If the
internal structure of the custom XOR gate is different then that of the built-in XOR gate,
the nets do not match up and therefore a non matching result is produced. Having a non
matching result should not happen in this experiment due to the fact that the XOR2 gates
have the same functionality. This is one area where having strictly gate-level testing in the
DARPA TRUST program could be an issue. Figure 4.15 shows one implementation of an
XOR2 gate.
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Figure 4.14: netlist Output Log from Initial Experiment
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Figure 4.15: University of Utah Library XOR2 Gate
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The implementation of this XOR2 gate is different than that of Fig. 4.9. Now a test
was conducted to see of the matching process still worked even if the implementations of a
XOR2 gate was different. Figure 4.16 shows the output log of this experiment.

Figure 4.16: netlist Output Log from XOR2 Custom Experiment

As one can tell from Fig. 4.16, the netlists failed to match. The first red-flag in this
experiment is that the schematic and layout netlists had a different amount of nets. This
means that the internal structure of the two versions of the XOR2 gate was different. Also,
there was one terminal that was un-matched from both versions. These two issues caused
the netlists to not match.
Since there was only one implementation of an XOR2 gate in the University of Utah
library, the next test involves matching a custom vs. a built-in NAND2 gate. Figure 4.17
shows the Univeristy of Utah’s implementation of a NAND2 gate.
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Figure 4.17: University of Utah Library NAND2 Gate

The implementation of the NAND2 gate shown in Fig. 4.17 is the same as Fig. 4.6.
A test was conducted to see if the netlists matched from the custom NAND2 gate and the
University of Utah NAND2 gate. Figure 4.18 shows the output log of this experiment.
As one can see from Fig. 4.18, the netlists from this experiment matched. This proved
that as long as the internal architecture is the same, the netlists will match no matter if the
gate is custom or taken from a library. Having the same internal architecture does not mean
these two circuits are the exact same. The schematic version was taken from the University
of Utah library. This circuit has different internal net names and the size of the transistors
were not the same as the metal layout version. The metal layout version was designed by
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Figure 4.18: netlist Output Log from NAND2 Custom Experiment

the author and is based off the schematic of a NAND2 the author created. Comparing these
two versions proved that circuits taken from a existing library can be used in the DARPA
TRUST process as a custom metal layout was used in the comparison.
The final experiment conducted when comparing custom vs. built-in circuits was to
change the pin names to see if the netlists still matched. The same NAND2 schematic taken
from the University of Utah library shown in Fig. 4.17 was used, and that was compared to
the metal layout NAND2 shown in Fig. 4.6. The only difference is that the output terminal
in the metal layout version was changed from Y to Z. The netlists from the metal layout is
shown in Fig. 4.19. The result of this experiment is shown in Fig. 4.20.

As one can see from Fig. 4.20, the netlists did not match. The internal structure of the
schematic and metal layout version was the same, and therefore all of the nets matched.
However, the terminals did not match and this caused the entire netlist to not match. This
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Figure 4.19: netlist from NAND2 Metal Layout Z Terminal

Figure 4.20: Output Log from NAND2 Metal Layout Z Terminal
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test proved that the DARPA TRUST program would falsely flag two equivalent circuits as
different due to a small alteration such as an output pin name.
The custom vs. built-in circuits experiment examined the limitations of trusting
circuits. One must be careful when using built-in circuits as they can cause the netlists
to not match if the designer does not pay attention to the internal structure and the pin
names. The results from this experiment in the end were successful as built-in gates taken
from a library are able to be used when trusting circuits.
4.3

Extracting parasitic capacitance
The next experiment conducted in this research was to examine how parasitic

capacitance affects the netlist matching process. There was a possibility that parasitic
capacitance in the metal layout version of a circuit could cause the netlist to differ so much
from the schematic version of the same circuit that the netlists did not match. The first step
in this experiment was to determine if there was a change in the netlists between the metal
layout inverter circuit with and without extracting the parasitic capacitance. Figure 4.21
shows the netlists of an inverter with and without extracting parasitic capacitance. As one
can see from Fig. 4.21, the netlist with the parasitic capacitance adds more complexity.
However, this did not affect the LVS output matching process, and the netlists matched
even with the parasitic capacitance added.
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Figure 4.21: Inverter netlists with and without parasitic capacitance

The next step when experimenting with parasitic capacitance was to test the extracted
parasitic capacitance with a more complex circuit. The test article in this case was the
XOR2 gate. The same process used with the inverter test was applied to the XOR2 gate,
and the resulting netlists are shown in Fig. 4.22. Comparing Fig. 4.22 from Fig. 4.11, it is
shown that parasitic capacitance adds lines to the netlist. Like the inverter, extracting the
parasitic capacitance had an effect on the netlist. The parasitic capacitance netlist for this
experiment added a lot more complexity for the netlist but as with the case of the inverter
the LVS matching process was not affected as the layout and schematic versions of the
XOR2 gate matched.
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Figure 4.22: XOR2 netlists with parasitic capacitance
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Even though extracting parasitic capacitance did not have an affect on the LVS
matching process, this does not mean that this should not be a concern for the DARPA
TRUST program. When looking at the log for the LVS run, it was discovered that the
parasitic capacitance lines were removed from the netlists. This means that the matching
process did not even take this into consideration even though this could cause issues with
the actual design of a real-life circuit. The issues that come with parasitic capacitance
will not necessarily affect the netlist matching process. Running this experiment should
be a matter of testing the actual functional design and not trying to verify circuit operation
with netlists. This is another area that the DARPA TRUST program overlooks because
the program is strictly looking at netlist matching. Future work could potentially take this
feature out of the rules file to keep the parasitic capacitance in the matching process.
4.4

Transmission Lines
Examining how transmission lines could potentially affect the DARPA TRUST

program was the next experiment conducted in this research.

In this research, the

transmission line was metal wiring between two inverters. The inverters varied in size
to determine if this had any affect on the netlists. Also, the length and the width of the
metal wire between the two inverters was changed to see if this had any affect on the
output. When dealing with parasitic capacitance, the longer and wider the wider the metal
wire, the more parasitic capacitance produced. There were four different test cases that
were used in this experiment. Figures 4.23, 4.24, 4.25, and 4.26 shows the four different
configurations. The four different configurations were a normal transmission line, a wide
transmission line, a long transmission line, and a long and wide transmission line. The
goal of this experiment was to determine if the netlists vary at all between the four different
configurations. Figure 4.27 shows the four netlists corresponding to the four different
configurations.
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Figure 4.23: Normal Transmission Line
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Figure 4.24: Wide Transmission Line

Figure 4.25: Long Transmission Line
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Figure 4.26: Long and Wide Transmission Line
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Figure 4.27: netlists from Four Transmission Configurations
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As one can see from Fig. 4.27, the four different configurations has no affect on
the resulting netlists. This means that no matter what size the transmission line is, the
netlists will always produce a matching result because there is no change in the parasitic
capacitance. One hypothesis is that the netlist model of a circuit skips transmission line
impact on a circuit. The netlist strictly deals with nets and even though one can see
parasitic capacitance in the netlist, the amount of capacitance is not shown. Overlooking the
amount of capacitance is a flaw in strictly verifying circuits based on the netlists. Another
possible explanation for this is that the transmission lines were not long or wide enough
to distinguish a change in the designs. The four configurations are at µm size and maybe
having the lines run over a meter would detect a change in the netlists. Future work for this
research could include why this phenomenon is occurring.
4.5

IP Cores
The next aspect in this research was to perform “trusting” of digital circuits taken

from cores from opencores.org. The first step in this experiment was to choose cores
taken from opencores.org. The goal behind this step was to choose differing cores that are
applicable to the Air Force and have differing logic depth and gates. The first core chosen
was a microprocessor without interlocked pipeline stages (MIPS) 16-bit processor. This is
because it is a simple processor that would provide a proof of concept to the methodology
behind this experiment. Figures 4.28, 4.29, and 4.30 show the top level Verilog code of a
MIPS 16-bit processor.
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Figure 4.28: 16-bit MIPS Processor Top Level Module Part 1
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Figure 4.29: 16-bit MIPS Processor Top Level Module Part 2

Figure 4.30: 16-bit MIPS Processor Top Level Module Part 3
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This is just the top-level module code, and there are many other modules underneath
this module. Other cores that were selected for this experiment were: a cryptography
core (e.g. AES), DSP core (e.g. FFT-based FIR filter), arithmetic core (e.g. accumulator),
memory core (asynchronous SDRAM controller), and video controller core (H.264). These
cores were selected because they are used in different applications and have differing logic
depth and architecture.
The next step in this experiment was to synthesize the VHDL or verilog code in the
RTL compiler tool in Cadence. The first core chosen was the accumulator core since it is
the most basic out of all the cores listed above. The .tcl script used in this experiment is
shown in Fig. 4.31.
The main goal of the .tcl file is to assign a library to use when synthesizing the code.
The result of this experiment was unsuccessful. When trying to synthesize the VHDL code,
the error message in Fig. 4.32 was shown.
Once this error was shown the library file was examined and that file is shown in
Fig. 4.33. After doing many different changes to the .lib file and trying to use different
libraries, it was determined that this experiment could not be done with the given libraries.
Either the Cadence software at AFIT is not capable of synthesizing VHDL/Verilog code in
the RTL compiler or the proper libraries have not been added to accomplish this task. The
hypothesis taken for this experiment is the latter and that the proper libraries have not been
added to the VLSI lab computers to accomplish this task.
Even though this experiment was a failure, the overall research has not been hindered
as lessons were learned from this experiment and should be used in future work in
continuing this area of research.
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Figure 4.31: .tcl Script used for RTL Compiler
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Figure 4.32: Error Message in RTL Compiler

Figure 4.33: .lib file used for RTL Compiler
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4.5.1

Potential Solutions.

There are two solutions that the author has come up with to fix this issue. The
first solution is to work with the head software engineer, Mr. David Doak, at AFIT and
incorporate the correct libraries for this experiment to be conducted. Working with the
head software engineer from AFIT will correctly identify if the problem was with the
Linux operating system. If the issue was with the Linux operating system, Mr. Doak
can help resolve this issue and eventually the IP core experiment can be conducted at the
AFIT VLSI lab.
The second solution is to conduct the research at the AFRL MSDC as that lab has the
capability to use this software with the proper libraries. Mr Christopher Taylor and Mr.
Todd James at AFRL are very proficient in the Cadence Encounter software and working
with these two individuals can help resolve the issue with the Cadence Encounter program.
Once a proficiency is achieved in the Encounter software, the research can be conducted
at AFIT’s VLSI lab. From this experience, a necessary understanding of the Encounter
software and Cadence libraries can aid in moving the research to AFIT.
4.6

Summary
The methodology outlined in Chapter 3 was applied to the different experiments and

results were achieved. Basic transistor-level testing of three basic gates was conducted
to see if they could be “trusted” under different circumstances. These circumstances
were: custom vs. built-in library gates, parasitic capacitance inside the metal layout, and
transmission lines. These experiments brought to light potential vulnerable areas when
trusting integrated circuits. Testing of digital circuits was attempted and were unfortunately
unsuccessful due to issues in the library provided by the Cadence software in the VLSI lab.
Table 4.1 shows a quick summary on what has been done in the past, what I have done, and
future work.
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Table 4.1: Thesis Summary table
Previous Work

Performed Work

Future Work

Gate-level testing

Transistor-level testing

Testing on fabricated circuits
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V.

5.1

Conclusion and Future Work

Summary
This thesis has brought to light possible areas of vulnerabilities when “trusting”

integrated circuits. It also attempted to take a look at differing digital IP cores to test the
limitations of the DARPA TRUST program. Transistor-level testing was conducted to look
at possible areas of exploitation. Custom and built-in circuits taken from the NCSU and
University of Utah library were tested to see if having pre-made gate designs has any affect
on the netlist matching process. It was determined that as long as the internal structure
and pin names were matching between the schematic and metal layout, then the matching
process was not affected. Parasitic capacitance was extracted from the metal layout version
of gates to see if this had any affect on the netlist matching process because it is possible
that parasitic capacitance can affect circuit operation over time. It was determined that the
netlist matching rules file throws out parasitic capacitance during the matching process and
therefore was not investigated. Transmission lines were examined between two inverters to
see if the length and width of the line had any affect on the matching process. Since the rules
file throws out parasitic capacitance, this test proved to result in matching netlists. Finally,
digital IP cores were attempted to be tested to discover the limitations of the DARPA
TRUST program and to ultimately try to characterize which gates are more likely to be
tampered with. This experiment was unsuccessful due to the library provided to the AFIT
VLSI lab. This research ultimately identified a few areas where “trusting” circuits could
potentially lead to errors. It is suggested that the DARPA TRUST program start looking
into doing transistor-level testing to try and prevent potential areas when matching circuits.
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5.2

Future Work
This research only focused on doing transistor-level testing in the Cadence Virtuoso

tool. Future work could potentially conduct transistor-level testing on a platform different
from the Cadence Virtuoso tool.
5.2.1

IP Cores at AFIT.

The next step in this research would be to finish what was unable to be done in this
thesis. Verification of IP cores using Cadence Encounter was the ultimate goal of one of the
experiments. Future work could be importing a library so that testing and verification of
digital IP cores can be conducted with the ultimate goal being characterizing digital gates
based on vulnerabilities in being detected.
5.2.2

Parasitic Capacitance Potential Problem.

In this research parasitic capacitance was looked at to see if it had any affect on the
matching process. However, the rules file provided in the LVS matching process threw out
all of the parasitic capacitance components. Future work could be changing the rules file to
not throw away the parasitic capacitance and then repeat the matching process. This could
shed to light to see if there is some threshold of parasitic capacitance that would cause the
netlists to not match.
5.2.3

Increasing Complexity in Custom vs. Built-in Circuits.

In this research the most complicated gate looked at was an XOR2 gate. Increasing
the complexity to an adder or multiplier adds more nets and sees how scaling affects the
custom vs. built-in matching process. Since there are many different ways to implement an
adder, there are more ways for the built-in libraries to have differing internal architecture
that the designer needs to be aware of. An example experiment is to test the many different
adder implementations against one “control” adder implementation. Testing these different
internal architectures against one custom gate will help draw conclusions if adding more
nets could potentially change the matching process.
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5.2.4

Fabrication.

The ultimate goal of this research is to test and verify fabricated circuits. Fabrication
centers throw away inoperable circuits. Obtaining these circuits and conducting testing
on them at the transistor-level can provide real world results and not just simulations.
These circuits will have parasitic capacitance and transmission lines. Running a similar
methodology outlined in this research with actual fabricated circuits can provide more
insight on if parasitic capacitance and transmission lines affect a real world circuit.
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